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In this paper we study the impact of two-sided nominal shocks in a dynamic, gen-
eral equilibrium macroeconomic model comprised of heterogeneous sectors where
changing prices is costly. In our model, heterogeneity arises from two princi-
pal sources. First, the degree of complementarity (or substitutability) may di⁄er
across sectors on account of di⁄ering price or cost elasticities. Alternatively, or
in addition, the costs of changing prices may di⁄er systematically across di⁄erent
sectors. Recent empirical and theoretical work seems to indicate that both of these
sources of heterogeneity may be important. On the one hand, there is evidence
of marked di⁄erences in the frequency of repricing across di⁄erent categories of
goods, even against the backdrop of more or less low and stable in￿ ation; see
Bils and Klenow (2004). On the other hand, the analysis of Gertler and Leahy
(2006) suggests that, absent su¢ cient strategic complementarity, state-dependant
pricing models may imply that nominal shocks have an implausibly low impact
on aggregate output dynamics. We incorporate both sorts of heterogeneity and
analyze the signi￿cance of nominal shocks. We demonstrate that, even in the
case when strategic complementarities are equal across the sectors, the system-
atic di⁄erences in costs of price adjustment are su¢ cient for nominal shocks to
have a sizeable impact on aggregate output and prices. We are able, despite the
apparent complexity of our set-up, to exploit certain fundamental properties of
Markov processes to obtain analytical expressions for the stationary distributions
of aggregate output and prices for the case of two sectors, and this allows us to
calculate the correlation between output and monetary (i.e., nominal) shocks.
In addition to demonstrating how to construct analytically the aggregate er-
godic distributions just mentioned, we show that our simple model economy has
some qualitative features that we may observe in actual economies: It implies
di⁄erent sectoral responses to aggregate shocks; we observe smooth dynamics and
Phillips curve-type behavior at the aggregate level; and we can explain a sizeable
e⁄ect on output from demand shocks.
1.1. (S;s) Pricing and Macroeconomic Dynamics
The development of theoretical models based on (S;s) pricing constitutes an in-
￿ uential and important line of thought going back to Barro (1972) and Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977, 1983), analyses that were in turn motivated by the seminal work
of Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951). This work has been developed recently
by, amongst others, Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997),
2and more recently still by Dotsey, King and Wollman (1999), Danziger (1999),
Golosov and Lucas (2003) and Gertler and Leahy (2006).
The basic idea behind these (S;s) pricing models is straightforward enough;
￿rms face a resource cost of adjusting prices when demand or cost conditions alter.
As a consequence, observed prices of almost all goods will di⁄er from what would
be the optimal price in the absence of this cost.
Some analyses in the (S;s) pricing tradition imply that monetary shocks have
little impact on output (Golosov and Lucas, 2003) or none at all (Caplin and Spul-
ber, 1987). However, these conclusions may be driven by particular features of the
models employed.1 But, in general it seems that the (S;s)-pricing general equilib-
rium model is as consistent with signi￿cant short-run monetary nonneutrality as
the more popular time-dependent approach to modelling price stickiness (at least
in low-in￿ ation environments); see, for example, Klenow and Kryvstov (2005),
Dotsey, King and Wollman (1999) and Gertler and Leahy (2006).
But there may be other stylized facts that these models have di¢ culty con-
fronting. In practice price changes may not be highly synchronized (i.e., prices
may often move in di⁄erent directions across di⁄erent sectors), as Bils and Klenow
(2004) show for the US and Dhyne et al. (2004) demonstrate for countries in the
Euro area, whilst many (S;s) pricing models generally suggest a high level of syn-
chronization. And notably, there is evidence that there are systematic di⁄erences
across sectors in the economy in the frequency of price adjustment; again Bils and
Klenow (2004) document this for the US and Dhyne et al. (2004) show that the
same is true in the Euro area.2
This observed degree of price change asynchronization and the systematic sec-
toral asymmetries suggest that heterogeneity is an important issue that needs
to be incorporated in any successful (S;s) model, as Golosov and Lucas (2003)
emphasize.
In this paper we make a start at introducing sectoral heterogeneity into a
popular (S;s) model. Motivated by the observation that we just mentioned, that
there appears to be some systematic variation in the frequency of price adjustment
across goods, we analyze the e⁄ects of heterogenous costs of adjustment. We
1In the analysis of Golosov and Lucas (2003), Gertler and Leahy (2006) suggest that the lack
of complementarity across goods may be key to undertanding their ￿nding of a muted impact of
monetary shocks. As regards Caplin and Spulber (1987), the key is the assumption that demand
shocks are always and everwhere postive. In our model we analyse a two-sided driving process
for money and incorporate complementarity.
2Dhyne et al. also document that the Euro area appears to have "stickier" prices than is the
case in the US.
3extend the in￿ uential work of Caplin and Leahy (1997) in a number of important
directions. First, we introduce consumers into the model with heterogeneous
preferences across goods in di⁄erent sectors; this enables us to track expenditure
￿ ows across sectors following a monetary shock and incorporate heterogeneous
degrees of complementarity across sectors (making some sectors inherently more
￿ exible-price sectors, regardless of the actual resource costs incurred in changing
prices). We also introduce multiple sectors into the model economy, where each
of these sectors is indexed by a di⁄erent cost of price adjustment (in addition to
potentially di⁄ering degrees of complementarity).
We are able analytically to characterize the stationary distributions of output
and prices, at the sectoral and aggregate level, for our model economy. We also
show that the stationary distribution of aggregate output ceases to be uniform,
as it would be if there were only one sector in the economy, and instead becomes
dependent on the number of sectors. These calculations are necessary when we
analyze the economy-wide impact of nominal shocks.
Our model with multiple sectors may also deliver more plausible aggregate
dynamics than a single sector model. The class of (S;s) models that we employ
here, based on homogeneity of costs and preferences, tends to imply somewhat
rigid dynamics; a sequence of positive (negative) monetary shocks causes output
to rise (fall), while entailing no nominal price response, until some boundary is
reached; further shocks in that positive (negative) sequence a⁄ect only prices.
With heterogeneous costs of price adjustment and preferences, the aggregate dy-
namics are more nuanced. For example, we demonstrate that, in the stationary
state, the correlation coe¢ cient between money shocks and output initially rises
in the variance of the money stock before falling. In fact, as Damjanovic and
Nolan (2006) demonstrate, that is also the case in the single-sector model, in con-
trast to the arguments of Caplin and Leahy (1997). We also show that as we add
heterogeneous sectors the correlation between money shocks and output is lower
in the multiple sector case (compared with the single sector case) for relatively
low monetary variance, and higher for relatively high monetary variance. Adding
heterogenous sectors in the way we do appears to help us understand why nominal
shocks may be quite important. Further, a natural implication of our set-up is
a degree of price asynchronization since in some sectors average real prices may
be rising or falling relative to their counterparts in other sectors. However as
we emphasize, one has to distinguish between nonstationary (i.e., out of long-run
equilibrium) and stationary behaviour. In equilibrium, independently of the type
of heterogeneity, there exists a natural order of timing of price adjustments. This
4timing or, more accurately, asynchronization of price adjustments is de￿ned in an
unique way by the sequence of maximal admissible sectoral outputs.
In Section 2 we set out our framework and characterize optimal behavior of
consumers and ￿rms. In Section 3 we de￿ne equilibrium, analyse the impact
of the various types of heterogeneity and examine the dynamics of prices and
output at the sectoral level. In Section 4 we characterize optimal and equilibrium
pricing behavior. We show that at both sectoral and aggregate levels the dynamics
of price adjustment are intimately related to the type of heterogeneity present
in the economy and show how asynchronization of price adjustment emerges.
We construct the joint density for sectoral outputs and we obtain an explicit
solution for the stationary distribution of aggregate output in the case of two
sectors. In Section 5 we draw on that analysis to examine the interaction at the
macroeconomic level between money, output and prices and demonstrate that our
model economy may be sensitive to monetary shocks. In Section 6 we summarize
and conclude.
2. The Model
Our model is a K￿sector model building on the basic framework pioneered by
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). In each sector, indexed by s = 1;::;K; output
is denoted by e y,3 and is produced by a continuum of monopolistic competitors of
measure one, indexed by j: Given a total expenditure level e E, and prices of di⁄er-
entiated goods across both sectors and ￿rms denoted by
￿
P j;s, the representative
consumer allocates expenditure shares optimally across goods and sectors. We
will assume that the utility of the representative consumer is logarithmically sep-
arable across sectoral aggregates.4 The objective of the representative consumer
is:
max[ln(e u1) + ln(e u2)]; (2.1)
subject to Z
e yj;1 e Pj;1dj +
Z
e yj;2 e Pj;2dj ￿ e E; (2.2)
3With some abuse of notation unless otherwise stated for all variables e ? the following labelling
will be used ? ￿ ln(e ?):
4Here, for simplicity, we choose logarithmic preferences and restrict ourselve to the case of
a two sector economy. It will be apparent that any separable utility of the form u1 + u2 with
u0
i > 0 and u00







where 0 < ￿s < 1 and ￿ 1
￿s denotes the price elasticity of demand in sector s:
















As a result of the optimization problem (2.1)￿ (2.2), it follows ￿rst that the









and that (2.2) holds with equality. That is, total expenditure, f E, is divided into
sectoral expenditure e Es as
e E1 ￿ e Y1 e P1 =
1 ￿ ￿1
2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2
e E; (2.6)
e E2 ￿ e Y2 e P2 =
1 ￿ ￿2
2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2
e E: (2.7)
We turn now to price setting. We shall make two further assumptions. First,
the velocity of money is normalized to unity so that total expenditure e E is equal
to nominal money balances f M. Second, ￿rms in each sector face an isoelastic
production cost function of the form !c0e y
￿
j=￿, c0 > 0; ￿ > 1 where ! is the
(constant) real wage. Then, de￿ning relative prices and real sectoral expenditures





; and e es ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿s;1￿1 ￿ ￿s;2￿2




5The generalization to K - sectors case is straightforward.
6(here ￿ stands for the Kronecker symbol ￿s;s0 = 0 for s 6= s0) equation (2.5) may
be written as
e yj;s(e pj;s;e es) = e ese p
￿1=￿s
j;s ;
and the real pro￿t for ￿rm j in sector s is given by:
















As a consequence the pro￿t-maximizing relative price is given by
e p
￿








is a constant and ￿s =
￿s(￿s￿1)
(￿s+￿s￿1); 0 < ￿s < 1 since
￿s < 1 and ￿ > 1:
Now in log terms it follows that the price P ￿
j;s; all j; is a linear combination of
the price index and aggregate demand, that is,
P
￿
j;s = bs + Ps + ￿sYs; (2.9)
where bs ￿ lnBs and ￿s is a constant interpreted as a measure of strategic comple-




so that as ￿ ! 0 ￿rms j tends to raise its nominal price more as Ps rises i.e.,
when others ￿rms raise their prices. In a frictionless world all ￿rms adjust prices
continuously to keep their pro￿ts at the optimum and they all charge the same
price equal to Ps: It then follows from (2.9) that the optimal equilibrium level of
Y ￿
s
6 is given by Y ￿
s = ￿bs=￿s so that the optimal nominal price (2.9) of ￿rm j in
sector s in the absence of adjustment costs can be written as a linear combination




j;s = Ps + ￿s(Ys ￿ Y
￿
s ): (2.10)
Menu costs imply that ￿rms will not continuously adjust nominal prices. So, we
approximate the instantaneous loss in real pro￿ts to ￿rm j to be quadratic in the
deviation from target, P ￿
j;s. Hence,
Lj;s(t) = g(Pj;s ￿ P
￿
j;s)
2 = g [xj;s(t) ￿ ￿sYs(t)]
2 ; (2.11)
6Without confusion we may speak either of the equilibrium level of demand or real money
balances as they di⁄er only by constant factor.
7where xj;s = Pj;s￿Ps is the ￿rm￿ s relative price, Ys stands now for excess demand
and g is a positive constant.7 From now on, where we can safely do so, we suppress
the index j and further distinguish between di⁄erent sectors of the economy by
the costs of price adjustment in each sector, Cs: We assume that these costs are
￿ su¢ ciently di⁄erent￿across sectors such that when one sector starts to change
nominal prices, this does not immediately cause ￿rms in ￿ nearby￿sectors to change
their prices.
The dynamic relationship between real money balances, M(t) ￿ Ps(t), and
(demand-determined) sectoral output is governed by the equations,
dYs(t) = dM(t) ￿ dPs(t): (2.12)
The above equations easily follow from equations (2.6) and (2.7). We assume that
the money supply evolves continuously following a driftless Brownian motion with
in￿nitesimal variance ￿2;
dM(t) = ￿dW(t); (2.13)
where W(t) is a Wiener process.
Since the optimal frictionless price in each sector depends only on the sectoral
output and price index, ￿rms in each sector face a control problem of the same
sort; that is, they must choose a policy ￿ of adjusting their nominal prices so
as to minimize the expected present value of lost pro￿t given the cost of price
adjustment, C. Assuming that the discount factor r is constant, the value function
















where Et stands for the expectation operator and the sequence fTig represents
the time when the ith adjustment takes place.
2.1. The optimal policy
The optimal policy ￿ determines how ￿rms divide the impact of changes in demand
(the money supply) between their output and prices. Clearly, in deciding when
and in what amount to change their nominal prices, ￿rms have to keep track
7From now on when we use term sectoral demand and/or sectoral output we mean deviations
from their equilibrium values.
8of both how their nominal price di⁄ers from the optimal frictionless price and
aggregate output in their own sector. This implies the existence of a pair of
admissible boundaries for both variables x and Y: Assume that in sector s at
instant t the ￿rm￿ s relative price takes some lower admissible value, ￿Ss, and
that the output in that sector is at its maximal possible level +Y s: Then from
(2.11) it follows that the ￿rm￿ s instantaneous loss is at its maximal possible level
g
￿
Ss + ￿sY s
￿2
: We assume that the ￿rm then raises its relative price to Ss, that
is changes it by 2Ss, to be as far as possible from ￿Ss. Symmetrically when the
￿rm￿ s relative price takes the value +Ss and output is at its lowest level ￿Y s; the
￿rm changes its relative price by ￿2Ss: For all other values of relative prices and
aggregate sectoral output the ￿rm does not change its nominal price. Assuming





initial distribution of relative prices is uniform, then it can be shown (Caplin and
Leahy (1997) and Stokey (2006)), that the distribution of relative prices remains
uniform on [￿Ss;+Ss] and that Ys follows a Brownian motion regulated at ￿Y s:
The optimal policy, then, is to ￿nd such values for Y s and Ss so that (2.14) holds.
The optimality of such a policy in a one sector economy is established in Caplin
and Leahy (1997) and Stokey (2006).
2.2. Value function and optimal boundaries
At any point in time, total expenditure is divided between the sectors in constant
proportions, we use the expression for the value function given in Caplin and













(e2￿Y s ￿ e￿2￿Y s)
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and x 2 [￿Ss;Ss]: Optimal boundaries are uniquely deter-




tanh(￿Y s) = Ss coth(￿Ss)tanh(￿Y s); (2.16)
Ss(￿Y s ￿ tanh(￿Y s)) = ￿sCs; (2.17)
where Ss is the upper bound of relative prices, Y s is the upper bound of total





Before we analyze the distribution of relative prices and output at the economy-
wide level it is useful to examine more closely equations (2.16) and (2.17) as they
contain information about various types of heterogeneity that are present in our
model economy. It turns out that regardless of the type of heterogeneity the dy-
namics of aggregate output are essentially the same. What is more signi￿cant,
the timing (that is, the degree of synchronization/asynchronization) of price ad-
justment is solely determined by the sectoral outputs. Moreover, again regardless
of the nature of heterogeneity, the distribution of relative prices does not change
through time, although it ceases to be uniform (as it is in the single sector set-up).
In the set-up we have presented, there are three di⁄ering scenarios re￿ ecting
heterogeneity. First, we may consider the case when the price-elasticity of demand
is equal across sectors, ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ ￿, but where we allow Cs to di⁄er, C1 6= C2. We
label this (C)￿ type heterogeneity. The second, which we label (￿)￿type, is when
costs of price adjustments are identical C1 = C2 ￿; but where ￿1 6= ￿2 so that
there are di⁄erences in strategic complementarity, ￿s, across sectors. The third
case is (C;￿) ￿ type heterogeneity when both costs and the degree of strategic
complementarity di⁄er across sectors. In what follows we shall index sectors either
by C, ￿ or (C;￿) indicating the type of heterogeneity. Also we restrict our analysis
to the positive values of optimal boundaries. The symmetry of equations (2.16)
and (2.17) in respect of S and Y means that one simply reverses the sign to extend
the analysis to the lower boundaries.
8These equations are the same as equations (26) and (27) in Chapter 7 of Stokey (2006); we
have rewritten them in a slightly di⁄erent, and for our purposes more convenient, form.
103.1.1. (C)￿ type
In this case in each sector s the behavior of ￿rms is de￿ned by their cost of price
adjustment C. The next Lemma characterize the optimal boundaries Y (C) and
S(C).





increasing functions of cost with S(0) = Y (0) = 0:
Proof. Rewrite equation (2.16) as:
￿S coth(￿S) ￿ 1
￿Y coth(￿Y ) ￿ 1
= ￿: (3.1)
Now, consider equation (2.17) and let C increase. It follows that the left hand side
of (2.17) must also increase. Consequently, there are three possibilities: Both S
and Y increase; S increases, while Y decreases or Y increases, and S decreases.
It turns out that only the ￿rst of these possibilities is consistent with condition
(3.1). When C = 0(2.16) and (2.17) become ￿S = tanh(￿S) and ￿Y = tanh(￿Y )
with solutions S(0) = Y (0) = 0: The solutions of (2.16) and (2.17) for various
costs are depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.1.2. (￿) ￿ type
The next Lemma characterizes the behavior of optimal boundaries in terms of
strategic complementarity.
Lemma 3.2. Let Y s and Ss be the solutions to (2.16) and (2.17) and let Cs ￿ C
be ￿xed and equal across sectors. Then, the following statements are true:
a) Y s is a decreasing, and Ss is an increasing, function of ￿s;
b) For ￿s = 0; Ss(0) is ￿nite and Y s(0) = 1;
c) For all ￿s 2 [0;1) we have Y s(￿s) > Ss(￿s) with equality when ￿s = 1:9
Proof. From (3.1) due to the monotonicity of the function xcoth(x); statement
c) follows immediately. Combine (3.1) and (2.17) to get the equation e2￿Y =
(1+￿(S))=(1￿￿(S)) where ￿(S) = g=￿S(￿S coth(￿S)￿1) and g = r￿C=(4g):
For the solution to exist it must be the case that ￿(S) ￿ 1 which is equivalent
9In the case of strategic substitutability ￿s 2 (1;+1), and the inequality is reversed,
Y s(￿s) < Ss(￿s):























Figure 3.1: Optimal boundaries S and Y as a function of the cost of price adjustments,
C.
to ￿S(￿S coth(￿S)￿1) ￿ g: The previous inequality is satis￿ed for all S ￿ S(0);
where S(0) is a positive solution of the equation ￿(S) = 1; i.e., ￿S(￿S coth(￿S)￿
1) = g: The solution is unique and exists for all g since the left side is a monotonic
increasing function starting from zero. Clearly, when S = S(0); Y = 1: Now
from (2.17) it follows that this pair of solutions corresponds to the case of ￿s = 0:
This establishes b). To establish statement a) ￿rst note that solutions Y s and Ss
are monotonic functions of ￿s which is easily seen from (3.1) and (2.17). Then it
follows immediately that Y s is a decreasing function of ￿s: To show the second
part of statement a) it su¢ ces to show that there exists at least one ￿s > 0
such that Ss(￿s) > Ss(0): Choose ￿s = 1: Then S(1) is a solution of ￿S(￿S ￿
tanh(￿S)) = g: Now S(1) > S(0) follows from the fact that ￿S(￿S￿tanh(￿S)) <
￿S(￿S coth(￿S) ￿ 1) which is equivalent to tanh(￿S) < 1:
3.1.3. (C;￿) ￿ type
The previous analysis and results carry over to the more general (C;￿) ￿ type of
heterogeneity with the only di⁄erence that we now have increasing (decreasing)
sequences fY sg and fSsg: That is, there exists Cs;￿s;Cs0;￿s0 such that either
Ss = Ss0 or Y s = Y s0: To summarize, for all ￿ > 0 and C > 0 the sequence















Figure 3.2: Optimal boundaries Y and S as a function of strategic complementarity,
￿:
S(C;￿) is an increasing function of both C and ￿; whereas Y (C;￿) increases
when C rises but falls when ￿ rises.
3.2. Equilibrium and Dynamics of Relative Prices and Outputs
Whilst the driving process impacts both sectors in a symmetric manner and hence,
one might think, is a force for synchronization of decisions across sectors, we
have seen that the ￿rms￿problems are essentially sectoral a⁄airs; in solving its
optimization problem a ￿rm need only have regard to sectoral aggregates. In this
section we examine how this tension is resolved and de￿ne equilibrium.
A ￿rm￿ s optimal strategy implies that the distribution of relative prices in each
sector is uniform at any point in time. Since the ￿rm adjusts its nominal price
only when sectoral output is at its boundaries, it follows that the distribution of
relative prices, ￿, depicted by the bold line in Figure (3.3) moves up and down
in (S;Y ) space in the direction of the money supply. In that case all changes in
the money supply feed into changes in output. When both sectoral outputs di⁄er
from their extremes, no ￿rm adjusts its price and its action is fully synchronized
in the sense that all ￿rms either increase or decrease output when money rises or
falls. However this synchronization happens only at random time intervals when
output reaches the boundary.
13It is clear that, in general, neither price changes nor production decisions are
synchronized across sectors. For simplicity, consider the two sector case with
di⁄erent costs of price adjustment and assume that at each consecutive time step
￿t money falls by an amount, ￿M. Then the "elevator" (that is, the distribution
of relative prices) in the ￿rst sector (with the lower cost of adjustment) will hit
the boundary ￿Y 1 ￿rst. Assume further that money continues to fall. Then
with each consecutive time step, ￿t, a constant fraction (￿M=2S1) of ￿rms in
sector 1 will adjust their nominal prices while the elevator (￿2) in the second
sector will continue to travel down towards boundary ￿Y 2 (see Figure 3.2). The
situation where ￿rms facing the higher cost of adjustment change nominal prices
but not ￿rms from the lower cost sector (￿2 hits its own boundary ￿rst) is, of
course, possible but only for particular paths de￿ned on speci￿c initial conditions;
it can only happen a ￿nite number of times. However once the aggregates Y1
and Y2 fall into the set of their stationary values that possibility is ruled out,
as will be shown in the next section. In the stationary state, it cannot be the
case that the higher cost sector adjusts but the lower cost sector does not. So
in our model synchronization/asynchronization of relative prices is understood
as follows: When some ￿rms from the sector with cost C￿ adjusts then in all
sectors with costs C < C￿ some fraction of ￿rms also adjust. Identical reasoning
applies to the case with sectors with equal costs of price adjustment but di⁄ering
degrees of strategic complementarity, as well as to the general (C;￿) ￿ type of
heterogeneity.
It is important to realize that in all cases the synchronization/asynchronization
of price adjustments is entirely guided by sectoral outputs. Also note that we can
always order the sequence fY s(Cs;￿s)g in ascending order to get the new sequence
fY s0g. Then if some ￿rms in sector s￿ change their relative prices then at the same
time in each sector s0 < s￿ some ￿rms change their relative prices too.
Overall, then, our model predicts that the frequency of price changes is likely
to di⁄er systematically across sectors, that these changes will not be synchronized
and that prices are as likely to be ￿ exible downwards as upwards.10
We conclude this section with some observations regarding the fraction of
10These ￿ndings appear to be broadly in line with Dhyne et al. (2004) where a high degree of
heterogeneity in price setting behaviour, across both products and sectors, is clearly documented.
The heterogeneity is re￿ ected in the frequency of price setting and in the absence of price change
synchronization across di⁄erent sectors. Interestingly, Dhyne et al. also document that there
is no evidence of strong downward price rigidity in the Euro area. On average 40% of price
changes are downward movements. Our model with symmetric and nested boundaries is hence
capable of generating such behaviour.
14￿rms that adjust their nominal prices. In general our economy is characterized by
periods of no price adjustment followed by periods when some fraction of ￿rms
adjust. Note that the fraction of ￿rms which adjust is not constant but changes
in time. In our example with two sectors at any point in time the fraction of
￿rms which adjust can take one of three possible values; either zero when no one
adjusts (Y1 6= ￿Y 1 and Y2 6= ￿Y 2) or j￿Mj=2S1 when Y1 = ￿Y 1 and Y2 6= ￿Y 2
or j￿Mj(1=2S1 +1=2S2) when Y1 = ￿Y 1 and Y2 = ￿Y 2: Can we have a situation
where at every point of time a constant fraction of ￿rms change their relative
price? The answer is positive and is related to strategic complementarity. Recall
that a lower ￿ means that a ￿rm will change its nominal price more when others
do so. When ￿ = 0 the optimal nominal price is equal to the price index so the
only criterion for the ￿rm is how far its nominal price is from its optimal value.
In this case we know from Lemma (3.2) that Y (0) = 1, which in fact means the
absence of any boundary for output. Then, because money changes continuously,
at any point of time we have that a constant fraction of ￿rms j￿Mj(1=2S1+1=2S2)
changes their nominal prices11.
We conclude this section by de￿ning an equilibrium.
De￿nition 3.1: An equilibrium is an increasing sequence of optimal bound-
aries fY sg; a sequence of optimal boundaries fSsg; an initial distribution of prices,
and a set of pricing strategies such that:
(i) in each sector s relative prices are distributed uniformly over the interval
[￿Ss;+Ss];
(ii) in each sector s output is distributed uniformly over the interval [￿Y s;+Y s];
(iii) in each sector ￿rms change their nominal prices only when sectoral output
is at ￿Y s and their relative prices are at ￿Ss;
(iv) when the output of sector s is at ￿Y s then in all sectors s0 < s sectoral
outputs are at ￿Y s0 and the aggregate price index changes by an amount of s￿M:
(v) no ￿rm deviates from the price adjustment strategy in (iii).
4. Aggregate Dynamics
In a one sector version of the above model with two sided shocks, we know that
relative prices will optimally remain uniformly distributed, if they are initially
uniformly distributed. We also know that in each sector total output will be
11There is a similarity here with the Calvo model where also a constant fraction of ￿rms
changes its nominal price each period.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal boundaries for the two sector model. The left-hand picture rep-
resents nested innaction regions for ￿rms in both sectors having equal strategic com-
plementarity. The arrowed line with jumps (￿S2;Y 2) ! (S2;Y 2) and (S2;￿Y 2) !
(￿S2;￿Y 2) represent one set of possible paths for the ￿rm in sector 2 denoted by ￿
in the left-hand picture, returning to the initial state. The case of di⁄erent complemen-
tarities is presented on the right-hand side picture. The only di⁄erence is that regions
of innactions are not nested.
16uniformly distributed in the stationary state.12 Here we want to address two
issues regarding the dynamics of relative prices and aggregate output. The ￿rst
is to characterize the distributions of relative prices in the whole economy. The
second is to characterize the distribution of aggregated sectoral outputs. We start
with the ￿rst of these where the answer is more or less straightforward.
4.1. The distribution of relative prices
From the fact that the measure of relative prices within each sector remains uni-
form it follows immediately that the distribution of relative prices within the
sectors is simply obtained as a sum of sectoral measures. Consider again the
case of two sectors each of measure one. Since in each sector the same rule of
price adjustment applies ￿rms of measure 1=2 are uniformly distributed over an
interval of relative prices [￿S1;S1] and so too are the ￿rms (of measure 1=2) over
the interval [￿S2;S2]. We choose S1 < S2. The distribution of relative prices
across the sectors is not uniform (as it would be in a single sector set-up) but it
is time-invariant as depicted in Figure 3.3. It is not hard to see that the distribu-
tional shape is de￿ned by the the increasing sequence of optimal boundaries fSsg.
Recall that the timing of price adjustment is determined by the sequence fY sg:
The corresponding densities for the case of two and ￿ve sectors are depicted in
Figure 3.3. By way of illustration, it is straightforward algebraically to describe





1=2(2S2) ￿S2 ￿ x < ￿S1;
1=2(2S1 + n2=2S2) ￿S1 ￿ x ￿ S1;
1=2(2S2) S1 < x ￿ S2:
(4.1)
The generalization of this analysis to K sectors is straightforward and we
conclude this section by formulating two propositions for the cases of discrete and
continuous costs of price adjustment 13.
Proposition 3.2. Let C take values from a discrete and strictly increasing set
fC1 < C2 < ￿￿￿ < CKg Then for any relative price xs 2 [￿Ss;￿Ss￿1)[(Ss￿1;Ss];
12Harrison (1985) proves that the stationary distribution of a regulated Brownian motion is
uniformly distributed.
13Identical propositions apply for any type of heterogeneity as we will always have an increasing
sequence of optimal boundaries fSsg:
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Figure 4.1: The left-hand picture represents the density of relative prices ￿2(x) (bold
line) in the case of two sectors de￿ned by (4.1). The dashed horizontal line represents
sectoral density 1=2(2S1) and 1=2(2S2) is a continuous line between -S2 and S2). The
right-hand picture depicts the density ￿5(x).









Proposition 3.3. Let C take values from some bounded and continuous set








4.2. The distribution of aggregate output
Before we can analyze how sensitive our model economy is to nominal shocks we
need to characterize the distribution of aggregate output. In this subsection we
consider the dynamics of aggregate output Y =
P
Ys where each variable Ys is
uniformly distributed over its own domain [￿Y s;Y s] and the sequence fY sjs =
1;::;Kg is increasing. The result derived in this section holds for any type of
heterogeneity but for concreteness consider (C)￿type: In the one-sector economy
18output is uniformly distributed. In the multiple sector case, this is no longer
true. Intuitively, although ￿rms in di⁄erent sectors have di⁄erent costs of price
adjustment, there will still be some range over which their respective outputs rise
and fall together. Eventually, however, demand rises su¢ ciently that some ￿rms
start adjusting nominal prices, whilst others continue to meet demand at their
current posted prices. At this point, their supply responses diverge. It turns
out that the stationary distribution of aggregate output can, therefore, be split
into two parts. One part corresponds to the uniform distribution of absolutely
correlated outputs. The other part of the distribution represents the sum of
independent random variables. In terms of the aggregate dynamics of output
following a monetary shock, this is an important result which, as we show in an
appendix, is generalizable.
We calculate the stationary distribution of aggregate output in the following
way. First, we employ a state-space discretization and de￿ne the space of joint
stochastic processes for sectoral outputs (Y1(t);Y2(t)). Knowing transition proba-
bilities between the di⁄erent states, we then ￿nd stationary occupancy measures
of states (Y1;Y2) by solving the corresponding vector Markov equation. Finally,
taking the continuous limit we calculate the stationary distribution of aggregate
output as the sum of two dependent random variables, Y1 and Y2.
Let time take equidistant discrete values i.e., t = 0;￿t;2￿t;::;N￿t; and let
all stochastic variables change by small discrete amounts. We ￿rst de￿ne output
Y (t) as a regulated Brownian motion in terms of the underlying driving process,
M(t); which follows a simple random walk on a lattice14.
De￿nition 4.1. We say that the process:
Y (t) = M(t) + L(t) ￿ U(t);
is a regulated Brownian motion if for all t ￿ 0 the following properties hold:
i) Y (t) 2 [￿Y ;Y ]; ii) regulators L(t) and U(t) are nondecreasing stochastic
processes, with the following properties L(0) = U(0) = 0 and iii) L(t) increases
only when Y (t) = ￿Y ; and U(t) increases only when Y (t) = Y :
The role of regulators L;U is to keep output at the level Y = ￿Y (+Y ) when
money further decreases (increases). Then, at the next instant of time, output
14This means that ￿M(t) := M(t) ￿ M(t ￿ 1) takes value +￿ with probability 1=2 or ￿￿
with the same probability. To match driftless Brownian motion with in￿nitesimal variance ￿2
in the continuous limit, ￿t = T=N ! 0; we require that T￿2 = N￿
2: In addition we assume
that M(0) = 0:
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will stay at the boundary with positive probability. To see that more clearly we
construct processes L;U in terms of the exogenous process M(t): For what follows
it su¢ ces to de￿ne L and U in the presence of only an upper or lower boundary15.
We formulate two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Let Y (0) ￿ ￿Y and de￿ne the stopping time T￿Y as the ￿rst
time when Y (t) = ￿Y : Then the process Y (t) = M(t) + L(t); where
L(t) =
￿
0 t ￿ T￿Y
￿Y ￿ mins2[0;t] M(s) t > T￿Y
satis￿es properties i) ￿ iii) from De￿nition 4.1:
Lemma 4.2. Let Y (0) ￿ Y and de￿ne the stopping time T+Y as the ￿rst
time when Y (t) = +Y : Then the process Y (t) = M(t) ￿ U(t); where
U(t) =
￿
0 t ￿ T+Y
maxs2[0;t] M(s) ￿ Y t > T+Y
satis￿es properties i) ￿ iii) from De￿nition 4.1:
The proofs of these lemmas are straightforward; see Figure 4.1 where two cases
with upper and lower barriers are depicted.
Consider now two sectors of the economy with di⁄erent costs of price adjust-
ment. As we already stated, in each sector ￿rms face the same optimization prob-
lem and in each sector output follows a regulated Brownian motion but because
the underlying money process is the same for both sectors we would anticipate
that sectoral outputs are dependent random variables. The next proposition es-
tablishes the functional relation between sectoral outputs and also de￿nes the
state-space for joint process (Y1(t);Y2(t)):
15In the presence of two barriers the same constructions still apply but one has to
keep track of consecutive sequences of stopping times between the barriers. To keep
things simple we ommit it. For more details see Stokey (2006).
20Proposition 4.1. Let
Y1(t) 2 [￿Y 1;Y 1] and Y2(t) 2 [￿Y 2;Y 2] (4.4)
all t; be two regulated Brownian motions with the same underlying driving process
M(t) as in De￿nition 4.1 and Y 1 < Y 2: Then, for all t ￿ 0; we have
Y2(t) = Y1(t) + A; (4.5)
where A 2 [￿Y 2 + Y 1;Y 2 ￿ Y 1] is a random variable changing its value with
probability 1=2 to A + ￿M or A ￿ ￿M when Y1 = +Y 1 and money rises, or
when Y1 = ￿Y 1 and money further falls, respectively.
Proof: Consider ￿rst the case with two upper boundaries Y 1 < Y 2: Without
loss of generality assume that Y1(0) = Y2(0) = M(0) = 0: By De￿nition 4.1 and
Lemma 4.2 we have:
Y1(t) =
￿
M(t) t ￿ T1





M(t) t ￿ T2
Y 2 + M(t) ￿ maxs2[0;t] M(s) t > T2
(4.7)
where T1 and T2 are stopping times for processes Y1 and Y2 respectively. Then,
by (4.6) and (4.7), it follows that for all t ￿ T1; Y1(t) = Y2(t) = M(t). As
money rises and falls the point (Y1;Y2) moves along 45% degree line starting
from the origin with A = 0. At t = T1 we have Y1(T1) = Y2(T1) = Y 1: In
the next instant of time money can fall or rise with equal probability. If money
falls then the movement is along the same 45% degree line; that is, (Y 1;Y 1) !
(Y 1 ￿ ￿M;Y 1 ￿ ￿M). If money rises then the point (Y 1;Y 1) moves up to
(Y 1;Y 1 + ￿M) transferring movement of (Y1;Y2) onto the new 45% line and
rising A: For T1 < t < T2 we have Y1(t) = Y 1 + M(t) ￿ maxs2[0;t] M(s) and
Y2(t) = M(t) or Y2(t) = Y1(t) ￿ Y 1 + maxs2[0;t] M(s): As it is still the case that
maxs2[0;t] M(s) < Y 2; we have Y2(t) < Y1(t) + Y 2 ￿ Y 1: But whenever we are
initially below the line Y2 = Y1 + Y 2 ￿ Y 1, eventually monetary growth will be
such that, after some time, we shall arrive at Y 2: Therefore for all t ￿ T2 we
have Y2(t) = Y1(t) + Y 2 ￿ Y 1. Identical reasoning in the case of the pair of lower
boundaries leads us to conclude that after Y2 hits the boundary ￿Y 2; the point
21( ) 12 , YY





( ) 12 , YY





Figure 4.2: The left hand side represents how the point (Y1;Y2) moves in the state-
space as time passes in the presence of two upper boundaries Y 1 and Y 2. After t ￿ T2
the point (Y1;Y2) never comes back to the interior staying forever on the line Y2 =
Y1 + Y 2 ￿ Y 1. It may remain at point (Y 1;Y 2) with a positive probability during the
next instant of time, ￿t, which is represented by the circular arrow: In the presence of
two lower boundaries we have an absolutely symmetric situation. The right hand side
picture represents the movement of point (Y1;Y2) in the case with both two upper and
lower boundaries. The broken line represents one from a possible set of paths starting
at (0;Y 2) and terminating onto the ergodic set as indicated. During the transition it
happens that a fraction of ￿rms from sector 2 adjust their prices while ￿rms from sector
1 do not. This situation is impossible once the state (Y1;Y2) reaches the ergodic set.
This, of course, will happen with probability one in ￿nite time.
22(Y1;Y2) will move along the line Y2 = Y1 ￿ Y 2 + Y 1 forever. Now it is clear that
in the presence of two pairs of symmetric boundaries the state space of the joint
stochastic process (Y1(t);Y2(t)) can be represented by a parallelogram depicted in
Figure 4.3.￿
The fact that both Y1 and Y2 move along the 45%degree line (so that ￿Y1=￿Y2 =
1) except when at least one of them is at its extreme values also follows from (2.12).
Recall that when Y1 6= Y 1 and Y2 6= Y 2 we are in the inaction region where no
￿rm adjusts its nominal price. Here, all (log) changes in the money supply are
re￿ ected in changes of output and these changes are distributed equally between
the sectors.
The money supply process generates an ergodic Markov chain16 on the space
(Y1;Y2) de￿ned in Proposition 4.1. The next proposition de￿nes limiting occupa-
tion probabilities ￿(Y1;Y2)17 of states (Y1;Y2) depicted in Figure 4.3.
Proposition 4.2. Let outputs Y1 and Y2 take only discrete and equidistant
integer values in the intervals [￿N1;N1] and [￿N2;N2] respectively, as represented






n1n2 Y2 = Y1 + (Y 2 ￿ Y 1)
n1+1￿￿




where ￿ = 0;1;:::n1, n1 = 2N1 + 1; and n2 = 2N2 + 1:￿
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Now we state our main result by formulating Theorem 4.1.
Thoerem 4.1. Let the economy consist of two di⁄erent sectors with strictly
increasing optimal boundaries
￿
Y iji = 1;2
￿
. Let output Yi in each sector i follow
a regulated Brownian motion. Then, in the stationary state, the density function
of aggregate output, de￿ned as Y = Y1 +Y2, is given by a weighted average of two
densities:
￿(Y ) = (1 ￿ !)￿1 + !￿2(Y = 2z1 + z2); (4.9)
16It is apparent from Figure 4.3 that all states comunicate with each other, and hence that
the chain is irreducible. Further, because by construction our chain is ￿nite, it is necesarily
positive-recurrent. In addition it is aperiodic so the existence of a stationary distribution is
guaranteed.
17These probabilities are equal to the inverses of the mean recurrence times of the underlying
Markov chain. They can also be interpreted as the proportion of time spent in the corresponding
states. We interpret them as probabilities of the state (Y1;Y2) on the discretized state-space.




Y 1(Y 2 ￿ Y 1)
Y 1Y 2
:
￿1 denotes the density of a uniformly distributed random variable on the interval





and ￿2 is the density of the sum of two independently, non-identically and uni-
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Proof. See Appendix 2.
The density has two components, visualized in Figure 4.4. First, we recognize
the in￿ uence of the uniformly distributed outputs from the two sectors which
is re￿ ected in the uniform density, ￿1
18: Second, there is the in￿ uence of the
independent portions of the sectoral outputs, that is the density for the sum of
two independent uniformly and nonidentically distributed random variables (see,
for example, RØnyi, 1970).
5. The Relationship Between Money, Output and Prices
In a single sector model, aggregate dynamics re￿ ect sectoral dynamics implying
that output and money are positively correlated, up to a certain point, after which
further changes in the money stock would result merely in a rise in prices (Caplin
and Leahy, 1997). In other words, a single sector state-dependent model is qual-
itatively consistent with Phillips-curve type behavior. However, these dynamics
appear to be very ￿ angular￿ : Inside the barriers, output rises with money one for
18In the case of three and more sectors this "uniform" part of the density function still exists
re￿ ecting the simple fact that there is a positive probability of staying in state (Y 1;Y 2;...;Y K):
In the case of three sectors, for example, this part takes the form 1=6Y K:
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Figure 4.3: Density function ￿(Y ):
one; once the barriers are reached, all further monetary shocks (in the same direc-
tion as those that led output to hit the barrier) result merely in price changes19. In
the case of K sectors these dynamic interactions are smoother. At the aggregate
level, output will not in general change with money one-to-one, and the economy
may be quite sensitive to demand shocks; these are the main results we are going
to show in this section.
We may easily calculate the correlation between changes in the money supply
and output for one and two sector economies. Since E(Y ) = E(￿M) = 0; the
correlation function is
￿(Y;M(t
0) ￿ M(t)) = E(Y ￿M);
where we use normalized variables ￿m=￿ and Y=
p
V ar(Y ). We also know, draw-
ing on Theorem 4.1, that




where for the one sector case ￿1(Y ) = 1=2Y , and for the two sector case ￿2(Y )
is given by (4.9). Using the de￿nition of regulated Brownian motion we simulate
paths of normalized Y and ￿M for both one and two sectors for di⁄erent values
of the standard deviation of money. Optimal boundaries Y (￿) are calculated from
19It is worth emphasising that this qualitative feature of the model is not merely a function of
having closed the model with a simple quantity-type equation. With richer nominal speci￿cation,
the same basic features would be present.
25equations (2.16) and (2.17) with parameters g = 0:5; ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:8; r = 0:05: We
compare a one sector economy with a two sector economy. We choose for the single
sector economy C1 = 0:0015 and for the two sector case economy C0
1 = 0:001 and
C0
2 = 0:002; so that average costs of changing prices are equal across our model
economies. Then, time series of length of N = 10000 for outputs Y1(0:0015); and
Y = Y1(0:001)+ Y2(0:002); and ￿M are generated. Normalizing time to T = 1
we have that ￿t = 10￿5. We found that t0 ￿ t = 100￿t was enough to achieve
reasonable convergence of outputs to their limiting distributions. The results of
these simulations are presented in Figure 5.1.
For both cases there exists a maximum of the correlation function. We can
conjecture such a maximum with equations (2.16) and (2.17) from which it is easy
to verify that Y (￿)￿ ￿ changes sign from positive to negative after some value of
the variance ￿c. For our chosen set of parameters, ￿c ￿ 0:033 in the one sector
case. We show that in the region ￿ < ￿c the correlation is an increasing function of
the variance of money. Before hitting the boundaries, the absolute value of output
increases with increasing j￿Mj. In the region ￿ > ￿c with rising variance, Y rises
allowing output to ￿ uctuate more widely (output is still uniformly distributed)
although at the same time ￿ uctuations in money are much larger i.e., Y ￿ ￿:
Again, this can be veri￿ed using (2.16) and (2.17).
If the standard deviation of the money supply process were to rise over any
￿nite period of time, then it can be shown that the probability of output reaching
its limits rises. As a result, the correlation coe¢ cient characterizing the money-
output relation necessarily falls. In the stationary state that reasoning is no longer
valid. Output is distributed uniformly over the whole interval [￿Y ;Y ]. Now as the
variance of money increases away from zero, Y rises more than proportionally with
￿, ￿Y (￿)=￿￿ > 1. Eventually, however, that e⁄ect subsides and the correlation
coe¢ cient falls. Damjanovic and Nolan (2006) provides a fuller discussion of this
point.
A striking feature of this model is that aggregate output is less responsive to
changes in the money supply for small values of the variance of the money stock
than is the case in the one sector economy. However, for larger variances, that
e⁄ect is reversed and monetary shocks have a larger impact in the multi-sector
economy.
The correlation coe¢ cient between money and output in the two-sector case
rises more slowly and peaks at a lower level (of the variance) than in the one sector
case for the following reasons. As the variance starts away from zero the barriers
are practically inaccessible in both the one and two sector cases and the correla-
26tion coe¢ cient rises. Recall, that we are here considering the ergodic distribution
of aggregate output and so in the two sector case the correlation coe¢ cient re￿ ects
the combination of sectors, one that will more often hit the boundary, and one
that will less often hit the boundary, for a given level of in￿nitesimal variance. On
the average therefore, the correlation function is lower for small variance. Eventu-
ally, the barriers rise less than one-for-one as variance rises, and in the two sector
case that happens more gradually since one sector faces a larger cost of price-
adjustment. This is one sense in which the aggregate dynamics are more nuanced
than in the one sector case. Two implications follow from this. First, a given nom-
inal shock in the multi-sector economy will, in general, result in price and output
movements, in contrast to the single-sector economy. Second, the multi-sector
economy may be somewhat more sensitive to nominal shocks since as the variance
of the monetary process rises the impact on the correlation coe¢ cient dies away
at a slower rate than in the single-sector economy. This issue is worthy of more
research as it is important to see how dependent these e⁄ects are on the relative
sizes of the costs of price adjustment, the degree complementarity/substitutability
and the variance of the driving process.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a macroeconomic model with multiple sectors. Incor-
porating multiple sectors in this framework permitted us to analyze extensively
the impact of goods complementarity and di⁄ering costs of price adjustment on
the behaviour of the sectors themselves and on the macroeconomy. We stud-
ied the impact of two-sided nominal shocks in this simple multi-sector dynamic,
general equilibrium (S;s)-pricing model. The model has a number of appealing
empirical implications; it captures why some sectors of the economy have system-
atically more ￿ exible prices, the smooth dynamics of aggregate output following
a monetary shock, and a degree of price asynchronization. We established that
incorporating multiple sectors is central to arriving at these three results in the
class of models under study.
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Figure 5.1: Correlations between output Y and changes in the money supply for one
and two sectors respectively, as a function of the standard deviation of money, ￿: For
the one sector case ￿1 is simulated with cost C1 = 0:0015: In the case of two sectors,
￿2 is simulated with costs 0:001 and 0:002 so that the average costs in both cases are
equal.
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Appendix 1: Solving the Markov Equation
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We proceed directly to ￿nd the joint distribution in the
stationary state, denoted by ￿(Y1;Y2), by solving the eigenvalue problem for the Markov
transition matrix P:
￿P = ￿: (6.1)
The number of di⁄erent states, i.e., the number of points in the set ABCD (see Figure
(6.1).), is n = n1n2 where n1 = 2N1 + 1 and n2 = 2(N2 ￿ N1) + 1: Obviously,
dim(￿) = n and P is a n ￿ n stochastic matrix with elements 0 and 1=2 : Instead
of solving the system of equations (6.1) directly it is more straightforward to compute
limiting probabilities ￿ directly from the balance equations 20.
Recall now Figure 4.3. If we consider any subset of admissible states with Y2 ￿xed
(that is, points parallel to the Y1 axis), then for such a set the following equation must
be satis￿ed: p(Y2) =
P
j
￿(Y2;Yj), where p(Y2) is the unconditional probability of Y2,
and ￿(Y2;Yi) are joint probabilities. However, it must be the case that p(Y2) = 1=n2
where n2 = 2N2+1 because in the stationary state outputs in each band are uniformly
distributed. It follows, then, that the joint probabilities in corners A and C are ￿A =
￿C = 1=n2: Now start from corner B and move to A along the edge BA and write
20It has already been established in Section 4 that the underlying Markov chain is
ergodic. Therefore in stationary state balance equations must be satis￿ed in each state.
30down the corresponding balance equations. Now, starting from corner B and moving



















￿(n1) = ￿A = n1￿B:
Hence ￿A = 1=n2 and from the last equation it follows that ￿B = 1=n1n2: By symmetry




and along the edge CD by
￿CD(x) =
n1 + 1 ￿ ￿
n1n2
;
where ￿ = 1;2;::::n1. To see where this latter relation comes from, note that as we




￿(2) = (n1 ￿ 1)￿D;
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::
￿(n1) = (n1 ￿ 1 + 1)￿D:
31Proceeding in the same fashion we ￿nd that all remaining points in the joint prob-
ability equal ￿B: Consequently, the balance equations are satis￿ed for all points. We




￿BA(￿ ￿ 1) +
1
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n1 + 1 ￿ ￿
n1n2
:


























n1n2: Finally, we require that the probabilities sum to unity:
X
￿

















n1(n2 ￿ n1 ￿ 1)
n1n2
= 1:
This completes the solution of equation (6.1)21.
21To further illustrate our solution we rely on the well known fact that Pk ! P?
in the limit as k ! 1 where P? is a stationary Markov matrix whose rows are
identical and equal to the stationary eigenvalue vector ￿￿: We chose N1 = 2;N2 = 4
32Appendix 2: Deriving the Stationary Distribution of Aggregate Output
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Having calculated the stationary distribution of joint
probabilities it is possible to ￿nd the stationary probability distribution of aggregate




P(￿ ￿ Y ): (6.2)




where the sum has to be taken over all values of Y1 and Y2 and where ￿ = Y1+Y2 ￿ Y .
In Figure 4.3 it corresponds to all points lying on the line Y2 = ￿ ￿ Y1 for a certain ￿.
Combining (6.2) and (6.3) we see that in order to ￿nd the probability function P(Y )
one has to sum joint probabilities over all points lying on the lines Y1 + Y2 = ￿ ￿ Y:
We perform this summation noticing that lines from Figure 4.3 are divided into
two groups; this sub-division provides us with our clue on how to take these discrete
calculations to the continuous limit. The ￿rst group is represented by lines containing
the points on the edges AB and CD where we have di⁄erent joint probabilities. We label
such points as elements in the ￿ exterior￿group (￿
E lines). The remaining probabilities
are elements in the ￿ interior￿group (￿
I lines). These are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Consider ￿rst the exterior group of lines and calculate P(￿) for an arbitrary line.
To begin with, rewrite the joint probabilities of points lying on the exterior lines in a
more convenient forms as:
￿
￿(￿) = (￿￿ + Y 1 + 1)￿B
where ￿ = ￿Y 1; ￿ Y 1 + 1;:::::;Y 1 ￿ 1;Y 1; along the upper (+) and lower (￿) edges
respectively, and ￿B otherwise.
so that n1 = 5 and n2 = 9 and the dimension of the transition matrix is 25 ￿ 25
(see the Figure 4.3 in the main text): We enumerate states by index j as fol-
lows. The ￿rst state, represented by the point A, is the state with j = 1 and
the last state, represented by C, with j = 25:After a su¢ ciently large number,
k, of iterations we obtain P? with all rows equal and given by: ￿￿=(0.1111,
0.0889,0.0667,0.0444,0.0222,0.02222,....,0.0222,0.02222,0.0444,0.0667,0.0889,0.1111),
































Figure 6.1: Joint state space (Y1;Y2) for outputs from two sectors is represented by bold
dots for values Y 1 = 2; Y 2 = 4 so that Y1 = ￿2;￿1;0;1;2 and Y2 = ￿4;￿3;::0;::3;4
(n1 = 5; n2 = 9): Two way moving between the states is represented by bold lines while
one way moving is represented by arrowed lines. Arrowed circles indicate the possibility
of remaining at corners A and C.
34Now calculate P(￿) directly from (6.3) for some ￿. Let ￿Y ￿ Y 2 ￿ Y 1: The line
Y2 = ￿ ￿Y1 intersects the upper edge BA in ￿ = (￿ ￿￿Y )=2 and the lower edge CD













where the last term is simply the number of points between intersections excluding the




+ Y 1 + 1)￿B + (￿
￿ + ￿Y
2
+ Y 1 + 1)￿B + (￿Y ￿ 1)￿B;
= ￿￿Y ￿B + 2(Y 1 + 1)￿B + ￿Y ￿B ￿ ￿B;
= (2Y 1 + 1)￿B;
= 1=(2Y 2 + 1) = 1=n2:
When the line ￿ does not intersect both edges the above relations also hold. For example
we can conclude immediately that P(￿ = N1 + N2) = P(￿ = ￿N1 ￿ N2) = 1=n2 =
1=(2Y 2 + 1): Moving one step further from, for example, corner C gives: ￿￿(￿Y 1 +
1)+￿B = (￿(￿Y 1+1)+Y 1+1)￿B+￿B = (2Y 1+1)￿B = 1=(2Y 2+1): Continuing
in a similar fashion we conclude that for any ￿ representing an exterior line, the sum
of joint probabilities is the same and equal to 1=(2Y 2 + 1): For points belonging to
interior lines the contribution is simply equal to 1
n1n2n(￿), where n(￿) is the number of
points on the interior line, ￿












Let Y = Y 1 + Y 2 =
n1+n2













as must be the case.
It is easy to rewrite (6.4) in a more explicit form, but instead of that we now proceed
to derive an expression for the probability function in the continuous case22. Introduce
22All the results and analysis will apply in the continuous limit as ￿Y ! 0 (N ! 1),
where ￿Y = 2Y =(2N +1): It is obvious that for arbitrarily large N system of equations




35the continuous variable ￿ 2 [0;2(a+b)] to enumerate aggregate output from the interval
[￿a ￿ b;a + b]: Then on the scale ￿ point D in Figure 4.3 has coordinate 4a and the
measure of edge DA is 2(b ￿ a): To see that this is indeed the case recall that in the
discrete case just half of the ￿ lines (here we speak of ￿ lines) terminate on edge CD:
The measure of edge DA remains unchanged as all ￿ lines terminate on this edge. In
the continuous limit this must be preserved so that on the scale ￿ properly applying
(6.4) means changing ￿ ! ￿=2: The situation is similar for n(￿), as it is just half of the
interval lying on the ￿ line. To illustrate this, we now provide an explicit calculation of
P(￿) for ￿ ￿ 2(b ￿ a):
Hence:
n(￿) = ￿=2;













Therefore, it follows that
n1 ! 2a;n2 ! 2b:



























Finally we write an expression for the probability function as a sum of two terms,





















2 (￿ ￿ b + a) 2(b ￿ a) ￿ ￿ ￿ 4a
1
4ab[2a(b ￿ a) ￿
(￿￿2a￿2b)2
8 ] 4a ￿ ￿ ￿ 2(a + b)























4 4a ￿ ￿ ￿ 2(a + b)












































we recover expression (4.9) completing the proof.
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